Can anyone point me in the right direction to get logs from the Admiralty for the night before and the orning of the battle?

...Which logs?
If you mean the logs from Prince of Wales or the destroyers, then all such documents are now in the National Archives at Kew.  
Indeed, all the relevant paperwork, particularly the boards of inquiry, etc, are now in the NA.   There is a lot of it.

Thanks for your reply Philo.
My main query is why the 2 eight inch crusiers (suffolk and Norfolk) did not engage the Prince Eugan and why was HMS Hood in the van position?
I know they were told the night before the battle to shadow and not engage but why did not Ad Holland use the 3 ships that were available to split the enemy fire and why was the P O W following when she had superour armor?
If they had use Comm Harwoods tatics when engaging the Graf Spee the outcome may well have been diffrent.
Was it pride or foolishness that he did not use all available forces on the scene.
I cannot remember the name of the 3rd ship but i think it was another crusier.

There were only two cruisers I believe.  Their logs would tell you nothing, apart from the courses steered, weather etc.

I am no expert on the action, but can say that the problem you raise is not new. In Captain Roskill's official "The War at Sea 1939-45",he discusses both of these themes.

Basically he wrote that as Admiral Holland had died in the action, no one would ever know why he had Hood in the van: "..we cannot tell whether Holland ever balanced up the arguments in favour of the Prince of Wales, rather than the Hood, leading his squadron into battle."   He continues that afterwards Admiral Tovey wrote that he very nearly sent a signal to Holland, advising that PoW should lead, but decided not to, as he did not wish to interfere with another Admiral's thinking. Tovey bitterly regretted later not sending the signal.

As to the cruisers, apparently Holland did want to use them. Roskill again - "He proposed to concentrate the fire of both his heavy ships on the Bismarck while leaving the Prinz Eugen to the care of Admiral Wake-Walker (with Norfolk and Suffolk). But the cruiser admiral was not told of this, presumably because Holland still wished to preserve wireless silence, and moreover, Wake-Walker was unaware of the battle squadrons rapid approach. As he was still shadowing from a position some fifteen miles astern of the enemy when battle was joined, he was in no position to carry out his share of Hollands plan".

Similarly the destroyers had been ordered to detach and search to the north, with the result that they were some thirty miles away to the north, unable to play any part.

It beggers belief that when you have a greater number of ships you should devide them and split the enemies fire.
I think your reasoning is right but I would like to know the results of the enquiry.
I am not trying to apportion blame as this lies with the government and the war deptment for not taking the measures recommended after Jutland.
With hindsight it is easy to judge, but under the circumstances I feel that the 1st Sea Lord  should have instructed the following crusiers to close the projected contact point to harass the P Eugan and draw her fire from Hood and P.O.W.
He should have if not told Ad Holland but raised his concerns sbout the deck armour and recommend that they should have change places during the night even if it meant that the contact was in full daylight insted of dawn.
Was it a false beief in Hood invincability that lead to the tradgic loss or a misinterretation of the risks
As alway we never seem to learn from past mistakes and fail to put into practice sound judgement.  

--Last edited by smeagal on 2009-10-17 15:33:13 --